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ABSTRACT
The contribution of the user to the industrial product innovation
process has been shown to vary greatly. In some industries the user
input appears minimal, while in others it is typical for users to under-
take the entire product design effort. In this paper, 16 studies contain-
ing empirical data on the matter are briefly reviewed. Next, two current
hypotheses regarding the cause of variations in the innovation process
role of the user are discussed. One focuses on the novelty of the need
which an innovation project attempts to address; the other on returns which
users might expect to capture from their innovation efforts. Some empirical
evidence in support of each is noted. Finally, some implications of the
fact of varying user involvement and the innovation process for firm and
governmental innovation policy are discussed.
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1.0 Introduction
Students of product and process innovation have long sought variables
which characterize firms, industries, technologies, regulatory environments
etc., and which correlate with and might "cause" successful innovative
activity. Over the past few years, a body of empirical data has been
built up regarding a variable seldom examined before in this context. Since
the variable shows promise, it is perhaps time to summarize briefly available
evidence for the convenience of interested researchers.
The studies we will review all deal with the varying role of the user
in industrial product and process innovation. In the sections which follow,
we will begin by reviewing three categories of empirical data which bear on
the fact of user involvement in the industrial innovation process: (1) the
sources of designs for industrial product and process innovations; (2) the
sources of "ideas" for industrial product and process innovations; and (3)
the sources of problem statements for research whose results were key to
the development of industrial product and process innovations. Next we will
discuss two hypotheses as to when and why the user adopts a major role in the
industrial innovation process, and finally, we will consider some implications
of what is currently known about the user's role in that process for firms and
government.
2.0 Users as Developers of Industrial Innovations: The Evidence to Date
Table 1 offers a summary of the results of all studies we are currently
aware of which provide numerous data points on a single industry and which
contain empirical data on the "source" of successful industrial product and
process innovations. In table 1 attribution of an innovation to a user or
manufacturer "source" depends on who first builds and utilizes it in conform-
ance with his economic function. Thus, attribution to a user source is made
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if a user builds and uses an innovation before a manufacturer builds and
sells a commercial version. And conversely, attribution to a manufacturer
source is made if a manufacturer builds and sells a commercial version of
an innovation before a user builds and uses a home-made version.
Insert Table 1 Here
An initial glance at the data in Table 1 will show something very
interesting: users seems to frequently be the "sources" of new product and
process innovations. This is striking, because the conventional assumption
is that product manufacturers are the developers of new products.10Since this
is so -- and since the impact on innovation research and practice would be
considerable if the conventional assumption were proven often incorrect (for
example, the prescriptive literature on "how to manage the innovation process",
is currently built around the conventional assumption) -- we should be especi-
ally clear about key definitions and methodologies by which some of the
studies in table 1 have come to a different conclusion. To this end, we will
first provide an example of a user-developed industrial product to convey
the flavor of what may well be an alien concept to the reader, and then will
move on to a summary of key definitions and methods.
2.1 Solderless Wrapped Connection: An Example of a User-Developed Industrial
Product
Solderless wrapped connection is a means of making a gas-tight, reliable
electrical connection by wrapping a wire tightly around a special terminal
whose sharp edges press into the wire. The system is much faster than the
preceeding system used to make such connections -- soldering -- and allows
much closer spacing of terminals.
The entire solderless wrapped connection system, including a novel
hand tool needed to properly wrap the wire around the terminal, was invented
IlI
Table 1: Empirical Data on the Source of Industrial Innovation
Study
Knightl
Enos2
Freeman3
Berger4
Boyden5
Lionetta & 6
von Hippel
von Hippel7
von Hippel8
Peck 9
Notes
Nature of Innovations and
Sample Selection Criteria
Computer innovations 1944-62:
- systems reaching new performance
high
- systems with radical structural
innovations (level I)
Major petroleum processing
innovatons
Chemical processes and process equip-
ment available for license, 1967
All engineering polymers developed
in U.S. after 1955 with >10mm pounds
produced in 1975
Chemical additives for plastics: All
plasticizers and UV stabilizers dev-
eloped post World War II for use with
4 major polymers
All pultrusion processing machinery
innovations first introduced commer-
cially 1940-76 which offered users a
major increment in functional utility
Scientific instrument innovations:
- first of type (e.g. first NMR)
- major functional improvements
- minor functional improvements
Semiconductor and electronic sub-
assembly manufacturing equipment:
- first of type used in commercial
production
- major functional improvements
- minor functional improvements
New product or production technique
described as advance in state of at
by industry trade journals 1946-57
- in Aluminum joining (w)
- in Aluminum finishing (x)
- in Aluminum fabricating (y)
- in Aluminum alloys (z)
Innovation Source a
n User Mfr Other
143 25%
18 33%
7 43%
310 70%
75%
67%
14%
30%
6 0% 100%
16 0% 100%
13 85%
4 100%
44 82%
63 70%
7 100%
22 63%
20 59%
52 17%
27 33%
76 30%
39 3%
15%
0%
18%
30%
0%
21%
29%
50%
48%
49%
79%
16 vc
12%
33%
19%
21%
18%
a See text for definition of "innovation source"; NA data data excluded from
b computations.
Attribute to independent inventors/invention development companies
percentage
c Attribute to Joint user-manufacturer innovation projects
d Table 1 data categories were translated from those used by Peck as follows.
Mfr. = Equipment manufacturer for (w,x,y); primary and secondary aluminum
producer for (z)
User = End product manufacturer for (w,x,z); primary aluminum producer for (y)
Other= Primary and secondary aluminum producers, commercial R&D companies,
government labs and foreign sources for (w); primary aluminum producers,
commercial R&D companies and individual inventor for (x); end product
mfrs, commmercial R&D companies, govt. labs and foreign sources for (y);
Independent fabricators, end product mfrs, gov't labs and foreign sources for (z)
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and developed at Bell Labs for use in the Bell System in 1947-48. After
several years of testing by the labs, it was given to Western Electric for
implementation. Western Electric decided to have the hand tool portion of
the system built by an outside supplier and Keller Tool (now part of Gardner-
Denver Company) bid for and won the job in 1952-53. Keller engineers suggest-
ed some modifications to the Bell-designed tool which they felt would make the
tool easier to manufacture and operate and, Western agreeing, began manufacture.
Keller had other customers who did electronic assembly work and realized
that some of these would also find the system useful. It therefore requested
and obtained a license to sell the tools on the open market. Currently,
solderless wrapped connection is a major wire connection technique and
Gardner-Denver (Keller) the major supplier of equipment for that use.
2.2 Key Definitions and Study Methods Used
The definitions and methodologies used by the several studies whose
results are summarized in table 1 differ in many particulars. Nevertheless,
some imprecise generalizations can be made, under the headings of definitions
and sample selection criteria, which the reader may f'nd useful for purposes
of Qverview.
2.21 Key Definitions
* Innovation, as distinct from invention, is the first utilization of
a new product or process. In the usage of the studies reviewed here,
first utilization means first world use, not simply first use within
a particular firm.
* An innovation "user" uses an innovaton but does not manufacture it
for sale. An innovation "manufacturer" manufactures an innovation for
sale but does not use it. The industries studied in table 1 were in
Il
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the main structured in such a way that the distinction between the
user and manufacturer could be made quite clearly via organizational
boundaries: few firms both used a given innovation and manufactured
it for sale. Two exceptions are (1) computer manufacturing firms,
which have many sophisticated uses for computers in-house, and (2)
petroleum product and chemical manufacturing firms (process users),
which often derive additional income from their process innovations
by licensing these to others. In studies of these industries (1,2,3)
coding for table 1 was done by taking the major role of these two
classes of firms as controlling: all innovations by computer manufactur-
ing firms were attributed to "manufacturer" and all process innovations
by petroleum product and chemical manufacturing firms attributed to
"users."
2.2 Sample Selection Criteria
· Most of the studies reviewed in Table 1 focus on innovations of "major
significance" (cf. table 1 for criteria of significance used by each).
Such innovations are comparatively rare and, while there is some evi-
dence that minor innovations follow a pattern similar to major ones
(7,8) this cannot be taken as a given at present.
* The innovation samples of the studies reviewed in table 1 consist of
successful innovations only. The high level of user-designed pro-
ducts and processes observed cannot therefore be used as a predictor
of success: a sample of failing innovations might show an equal --
or higher or lower -- incidence of user involvement.
* Several of the studies reviewed in table 1 (studies 1, 6,7,8)
judge innovation success in terms of benefit derived by the user
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("...offers a major increment in functional utility when judged relative
to previous best practice..."). Innovations selected on this basis
may be major commercial successes for product manufacturers as well --
but not necessarily (functionally important innovations are not necess-
arily of commercial importance to their manufacturer(s)).
3.0 Evidence Regarding Requests for Innovations from Users (Customers)
To this point, we have reviewed only studies which attribute an innovation
to the party which actually builds the first version used". It should be
noted that this is a very conservative measure of user involvement in the
innovation process in that it ignores user inputs- such as requests for
innovations from customers containing vague or precise specifications which,
while falling short of that criterion, may nonetheless be significant
contributions.
I have focused on studies which use this measure, despite its conservative
bias, for a simple but very important reason: data on the source of the
first functioning version of a given innovation can often be collected retro-
spectively with far greater reliability than can data on such measures as
the presence (absence) of "Innovation Requests" by customers and any associ
ated product/process specifications. The latter are evanescent and seldom
documented contemporaneously. In contrast, a first-functioning version of an
innovation tends to leave substantial contemporaneously-generated traces such
as the physical device itself, records of prototype construction and results,
patents, publications noting the accomplishment and its date.
Despite the difficulty of the work, however, several empirical studies
have explored the frequency with which innovation requests from customers
are associated with the decision to: develop new industrial products (table
2A); engage in research which ultimately led to new industrial and military
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products (table 2B) (in the latter studies the "customer" for the research
results solicited was an engineering group). The relevant finding of all
studies of these two types which we are aware of are summarized in table 2.
Insert Table 2 Here
(The interested reader will find a more detailed review of the studies in (18).)
Note that with one exception, these studies do not indicate the content
of the customer request. The data they provide is compatible with a request
as vague as: "Please think up a new product for me", or as precise as:
"Please make me 10,000 units of X according to my design." (The exception
11
is the study by von Hippel. In the sample examined there, it was deter-
mined that customer requests, when present, contained complete design data
for the desired product). Even given this caveat, however, it is useful to
find that the data provided by these two types of studies are clearly con-
gruent with the central finding of the studies reviewed in table 1, viz:
product users play a significant role in the innovation process in some
industries -- and a minimal role in others. Some of the authors of the
studies reviewed in table 2 find the evidence for significant user involve-
ment in the innovation process quite striking, as do we. For example, the
Material Advisory Board, in its discussion of the findings of its study of
innovation histories of ten important materials innovations, such as silicones,
observes (emphasis theirs):
In all but one of the cases studied, the recognition of an import-
ant need was identified in a majority of the events as an important
factor in bringing about the research-engineertng interaction.
Table 2: Frequency with which Manufacturers Initiated Work on art Industrial
Innovation in Response to a Customer Request.
Nature of Innovations and
Sample Selection CriteriaStudy
Data Available Regarding
n Presence of Customer Requests
A. Studies of Industrial Products
All projects initiated during a
two year period in "Chem Lab
B", a lab of a chemical company
with $100-300mm annual sales in
"industrial intermediates"
All "creative" projects carried
out during a 6 year period by an
R&D group concerned with plant
process, equipment and technique
innovations.
Semiconductor and electronic sub-
assembly manufacturing equipment:
first of type used in commercial
production (n=7); major improvements
(n=22); minor improvements (n=21).
All engineering polymers developed
in US after 1955 with >10mm pounds
produced in 1975
Chemical additives for plastics:
all plasticizers and UV stabilizers
developed post World War II for use
with 4 major polymers.
All scientific instrument innovations32
mfd. by Mass. firms which won"IR-100
Awards" 1963-68 (n=15); sample of other
instruments mfd. by same firms (n=17)
Standard and non-standard industrial NA
products purchased by three firms
29 9 of 17 (53%) commercially
successful product ideas
were from customers.
94 30 of 48 (62%) successfully
implemented projects were
initiated in response to
direct customer request.
49 Source of initiative for
manufacture of equipment
developed by users (n=29)
examined. Source clearly
customer request in 21% of
cases. In 46% of cases
frequent customer-manufacturer
interaction made source of
initiative unclear.
5 No project initiating request
from customers found.
16 No project-initating request
from customers found.
75% initiated in response to
"need input". When need input
originated outside product
manufacturer (57%) source was
"most often" customer.
Customers recognize need,
define functional require-
ments and specific goods and
services needed before
contacting suppliers
Meadows12
Peplow13
von Hippel 11
Berger4
Boyden5
Utterback14
Robinsonl5
et al.
III
Table 2: continued
Nature of innovations and
Study Sample Selection Criteria
Data Available Regarding
n Presence of Customer Requests
B. Studies of Research-Engineering Iteraction
Isenson 16
(Project
Hindsight)
Materialsl7
Advisory
Board
R&D accomplishments judged key to
successful development of 20
weapons systems
Material innovations "believed to
be the result of research-engineer-
ing interaction".
710 85% initiated in response to
description of problem by
application-engineering
group.
10 in "almost all" cases the
individual with a well-defined
need initiated the communica-
tions with the basic researchers.
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In almost all of the cases under consideration, it was an individual
with a well-defined need who was the initiator of the communications.
It was most frequently he who began the dialogue with the basic
researchers and determined its continuation until the need was
satisfied. 19
Determinants of the User's Role in the Innovation Process
To this point, we have presented and discussed evidence for the fact
that product and process users often play a major role in the industrial
innovation process. Next, we wish to explore current hypotheses as to "causes"
of a high -- or low -- level of user participation in the innovation process
of a given industry.
At this point, two hypotheses regarding the cause of a high or low
level of user participation in the industrial good innovation process are
under active consideration. The first of the hypotheses, offered in somewhat
different formulations by Utterback and Abernathy2 0 and Knight,21 is that
performance requirements are poorly understood by manufacturers in the early
stages of a new product area, and that new product innovations in these
early stages are therefore carried out by those closest to the need, e.g,,
users. This hypothesis also predicts a shift from a user to manufacturer
"locus of innovation" as, over time, the needs become more generally known and
well-defined. This shift occurs, Utterback and Abernathy go on to propose,
because when needs are well-defined, the key to successful innovation
becomes new technological insights -- and product manufacturers, it is suggest-
ed, have an advantage over product users in the latter arena.
The shift in locus of innovation predicted by this first hypothesis has
been observed in three of the industries studied to date. A statistically
significant shift in the predicted direction is shown in two of the studies
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summarized in table 1 during the time spans examined as follows: Knight's data1
showed a shift from user to manufacturer innovation as a function of time
p <.001 for systems reaching new performance highs and p .01 for systems
containing radical structural innovations (Mann-Whitney U Test); von Hippel8
found process machinery innovation which were the first of a "type" (e.g.:
the first to be used to carry out a new "process step" in the industries
studied) to be significantly more likely to be developed by users (p <.05,
2
x =4.1) than the major and minor improvement innovations which followed. Some
indication of the predicted shift is visible in the Scientific Instruments7
data (basic innovations vs. major plus minor improvements to these p = .34
(Fisher exact test), but not in the studies of petroleum processing innovation
or pultrusion process equipment innovation.2'6
The above-mentioned five studies are the only ones of the studies summar-
ized in table 1 appropriate to test the Utterback, Abernathy, Knight
hypothesis because their samples included both innovations from when the
product area "was new" and later innovations. On the basis of the evidence
they provide, we suggest that their hypothesis is an interesting and promising
one.
At present, the second hypothesis I would like to bring to the readers
attention has a rather global formulation, e.g.: the locus of innovation
activity (and cost) is a function of the locus of benefit from such innovation.
This hypothesis, of course, quickly reduces to that basic premise of market
economics: investment is a function of expected return. For a long time,
however, it was not clear that innovation had any relationship to such a premise.
In fact, as Schmookler 2 notes, economic theory tended to treat technological
progress as an exogenous factor -- a factor not determined by economic forces --
to be introduced into economic analysis ad hoc "like war or an earthquake".
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Painstaking work by economists such as Schmookler, Mansfield23 and others,
however, have now empirically established that economic measures such as the
level of investment in certain categories of capital equipment, and proxy
measures for innovation, such as rates of patent application bearing on
those types of capital equipment, are strongly correlated. Further, by
showing that rises in rates of invention follow rises in rates of investment,
they have been able to provide support to the hypothesis that increases in
investment cause increases in the frequency of invention (and, presumably,
related innovation) -- by raising the expected value of such.
Once it is established that invention and innovation are a function of
expected value, it is a short logical step to the hypothesis that the locus
of invention and innovation expenditure --user/or manufacturer and/or "other"
-- is a function of the locus of expected benefit. Peck, in his study 9 of
the sources of invention in the aluminum industry, made a pioneering attempt
to test the correlation between the amount and time-distribution of profits
logically derivable by potential "sources" of aluminum-related-invention --
producers of aluminum, producers of fabricating equipment for aluminum,
producers of products using aluminum, etc., vs., the actual invention record
compiled by these sources. Attempts to move the next logical step and
correlate actual profits obtained by firms having different functional relation-
ships (e.g. users of, manufacturers of, etc.1 to certain categories of innova.
tion vs. their actual record of innovation in these categories unfortunately
face severe methodological difficulties notably:
* Simply obtaining needed economic data on the costs and benefits of
innovation is very hard. (Corporations are understandably loath to
provide data on profits, etc. related to particular products.)
* Proper attribution of costs and benefits is often difficult. (For
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example, what is the proper benefit to be attributed to an innovation
which is sold as part of a larger system? It may contribute to
system sales -- but how large is that contribution?)
Making various important types of costs and benefits commensurable
is sometimes a problem. (For example, user-innovators of scientific
instruments are largely university-based scientists who are rewarded
primarily in terms of increases in understanding, reputation among
peers, etc.24 How does one make such benefits commensurable with those
with the benefit which might induce an instrument company to innovate
-- an increase in annual sales?)
Given this rather grim list of methodological difficulties, one might
well wonder how hypothesis 2 might be further explored. A possible answer
may be that, given real-world conditions, a small subset of data might be
adequate to test the hypothesis in numerous categories of industrial products
and processes. We elaborate as follows: the benefit to a potential innovator
is the benefit he can capture. Easily observable features of market structure
and institutional factors such as patent policy serve to put an upper bound
on what an innovator can capture which may be easily computable and be so low
for some classes of potential innovators as to allow us to predict where the
locus of innovation will not be. Thus, a user who innovates has two potential
ways to capture benefit from his innovation to compensate for innovation-related
costs incurred. He may benefit from in-house use of the innovation and/or he
may benefit from the diffusion of the innovation to others who wish to use and/
or manufacture the innovation. In the instance of the first method of capture
-- in-house use -- the upper bound on the percentage of total benefit available
from an innovation which a user-innovator may capture is simply determined.
___0_____^1__1_1____11_1__-__- --
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Assuming use of the innovation does not change market share, in-house
benefit captured is, simply, the same percentage as his share of the market
to which the innovation benefit applies. (e.g., if the innovation is
a processing machine which reduces the cost of manufacturing product A only,
and the user-innovator manufactures 20% of the total benefit potentially
derivable from the innovation via in-house use. (We emphasize that share-
of-relevant-market is an upper bound to the user's benefit from in-house
use because, depending on market circumstance and company strategy, the user
may choose or be forced to pass along some of the benefits to customers or
others.)) The second source of benefit potentially available to the user-
innovator involves the."capture" of some of the benefit obtained by others
when they use and/or manufacture the innovation. Mechanisms available for
such capture are royalties, license fees, sale of "know-how", etc.
Similar reasoning applies in the instance of capture of benefits by a
manufacturer-innovator: capture via in-house manufacture and sale has an
upper bound equal to the manufacturer's market share. A share in the remain-
ing available benefit must be sought via royalties or other fees from other
manufacturers and/or users. (In the instance of the independent inventor --
who neither uses his innovation nor manufactures it for sale -- all benefit
captured must be via fees from manufacturers and/or users.)
Clearly, many different strategies for capture are available as a function
of market structure, patentability of a given innovation, etc.25 In principle,
this plethora of options could lead to difficulty in predicting -- as opposed
to explaining post hoc -- the locus of innovation in any particular industry.
In practice, however, we speculate that,in many industries, capture of
benefits resulting from non in-house activity by user or manufacturer is
either restricted to a few clear mechanisms (e.g., licensing in chemicals)
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or absent. (In our studies of scientific instrument7 and process equipment
innovations6'8 we have seldom found any capture of benefit by innovators
other than via in-house use. Patents were either seldom applied for
(scientific instruments) or the innovations were of such a nature that
patents could easily be skirted by imitators (process machinery). Other
possible mechanisms for capture (e.g., effective brand-name "franchise")
were also largely ineffective in these industries.)26
Without an ability to prevent imitation or share in the benefits derived
from imitation, the potential benefit to some classes of innovators can, as I
mentioned above, have an exceedingly low upper bound. In the pultrusion
industry, for example, total sales of pultruded product distributed among
approximately 30 users of pultrusion machinery were found by Lionetta and
von Hippel6 to be approximately $60 million in 1976. Sales of pultrusion
machinery by the single commercial builder of such were found to have climbed
to a plateau of only $300 thousand annually. (Many users in this industry
build their own process equipment). Machine manufacturers and users alike were
seen unable to protect their innovations by patent or other means in this
industry. This observation plus the relative sales volume of users and
manufacturer observed seems to us to be a reasonable, hypothesis 2-based,
explanation for our finding that 85% of the innovations sampled had a user
source (It is also a reason to suggest that, in this industry, the shift in
the locus of innovation predicted by hypothesis 1 would not occur unless
and until the ability of the manufacturer to capture benefit from innovation
costs incurred improves. Currently, total before-tax pultrusion-related
profits -- a potential source of additional R&D funding -- is on the order
of $7 million annually for the total user community versus only $30-40
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thousand annually for the single commercial manufacturer of pultrusion equip-
ment.
In sum, I suggest that the above two hypotheses regarding causes of
variation in the locus of innovation hold interest and are worthy of
further research. As research progresses, further hypotheses will doubtless
emerge.
Implications
As we noted at the beginning of this paper, the fact of varying user
and manufacturer involvement in the industrial innovation process is
currrently clear but the cause of these variations is not. And, as the
reader will understand from the discussion in the preceeding section, a good
deal more research remains to be done before the cause(s) is well understood.
Fortunately, many major implications for innovation research and practice may
be derived from the fact of user and manufacturer loci of innovation development
(which may be empirically determined for any industry of interest), even if
the cause is currently unknown. This is so because knowledge of where innova-
tion occurs is an essential prerequisite to effective management of the process
by those working at the firm, industry or government level. In the remaining
paragraphs of this paper we will suggest a few implications for the firm and
then moving to implications for government.
Implications for the Firm
Users and manufacturers share the industrial innovation process no
matter which party is the "source" of an innovation -- the manufacturer
picking up the work where the user leaves off. As we noted at the beginning
of the paper, the currently prevailing assumption among practitioners of
innovations in industrial firms -- and of the prescriptive, "how to develop
new products" literature addressed to them10 -- is that the user's share in
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the innovation process is simply to have "needs" which the manufacturer can
explore via marketing research. Yet, as we have seen in this paper, in some
industries the user's role is typically far greater, involving the design and
fabrication of a "home built" version of the innovation and proof of its
value via field use.
Clearly, a manufacturing (or using) firm facing the latter situation
should organize its innovation effort differently than would be appropriate
in the former situation: both what the firm should be looking for at the
user-manufacturer innovation activity interface and what the firm itself
should do are significantly changed. Consider the following changes which
might logically be prescribed for a manufacturing firm wishing to switch
its innovation activities from manufacturer-sourced to user-sourced innnovations:
* Marketing research, now chartered to seek need data, analyze it, develop
responsive "product concepts" and estimate market sizes, would be
reoriented to search out data on user prototypes, analyze the utility
these have displayed in field use, and estimate their potential as-
commercial products.
' The sales force, now designed primarily to disseminate information
on present products, would acquire the added function of acquiring
information on promising user prototypes during visits to customer
facilities.
* R&D, now motivated and staffed to develop a product from concept
data supplied by marketing research, would be reoriented to perform
only product engineering work on user prototypes.
Of course, such changes in the established role of an organizational
group would not be easy to accomplish because they require related changes
in the interests and skills of group members. For example, salesmen are
-15-
now neither trained nor motivated (sales compensation systems generally
reward large volume sales of existing products, not possible sales of
future products) to seek user prototypes or report back what they see.
And R&D groups are presently staffed by people trained and motivated to do the
entire product development job, rather than by product design specialists only.
Clearly, the finding that users often undertake a major role in
the innovation process in a given industry will have major implications for
innovation-related practice for firms participating in that industry.
Implications for Government
Government has a major and pervasive impact on the innovation process.
It is a major funder of R&D, a major purchaser of innovative products,
and it sets the ground rules according to which others may innovate (FDA) and
be rewarded for innovation (patent policy). When it is demonstrated that, in
certain industries, users rather than manufacturers undertake the bulk of the
innovation work, some problems which have traditionally concerned government
policy makers will disappear and others will emerge. An example in
each category:
Government, correctly cognizant that innovation in process equipment
plays a major role in the economy's improvement in productivity, has
often cast a worried eye at the fact that producers of many types of
process equipment (e.g. machine tools) tend to be small and financially
unable to support sophisticated R&D programs27 This fact, I suggest,
will cease to be worrisome if and when it is demonstrated -- as we
have already seen done for some classes of process machinery -- that
manufacturers of many classes of such equipment seldom innovate
I
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themselves, but simply provide the manufacturing function for innovative
users.
Government has tended not to worry when firms which use innovative
industrial goods and are labor intensive (e.g. textiles) depart U.S.
shores. After all, it is reasoned, the comparative advantage of our
economy does not lie with goods of a high labor content -- and we will
still sell such off-shore industries the sophisticated capital goods
they need. It has been observed in two industries, however,6'11 that
innovative process plant and machinery developed by users is very likely
to be transferred to machine builders in the same country. An implica-
tion which government may find wise to test is: in the case of
industries characterized by user dominated innovation patterns, does
the departure of users of innovative industrial goods from the U.S
result in the decline of domestic manufacturers of such goods due to
the inaccessibility of innovative users?
1__1______·_1____1__1_1_1__ 11_________
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